WIRETAPPING-THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY-MINIMIZATION OF NONPERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS

REQUIRED BY NEW JERSEY STATUTE

-State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J. Super. 276, 284 A.2d 385 (Essex
County Ct. 1971).
The New Jersey State Police "monitors," in order that they be
proficient in their work, are "specially trained."' They first undergo
the standard training program to which all state police officers are exposed. Then they are versed in the nuances of investigating organized
crime and gambling operations. 2 Lastly, they are trained, by statutory
mandate,3 in what has been called the "dirty business" 4 of wiretapping.
The consequence of all this training is that these monitors, hour
upon hour, day upon day, and often week upon week, listen to tapped
telephones. And so, while crimes of violence soar to new heights, much
time is spent intercepting calls which deal with weather bureau reports, 5 shopping lists," or even perhaps the intercepted person's sex
life.7
State v. Molinaro" deals with "monitors," with harmless, private
communications, and with the interpretation of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (hereinafter referred
to as the Wiretap Control Act).9 In Molinaro a familiar situation is
presented. An application for authorization to intercept telephonic
communications was submitted by the Attorney General. It was based
upon an affidavit made by a state police detective which recited that,
upon receipt of information from an unnamed "reliable informant,"
illegal gambling operations were being conducted over specified tele1 State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J. Super. 276, 290, 284 A.2d 385, 392 (Essex County Ct.
1971).
2 Id.

3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-10(e) (1971).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5 United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 247 (D.D.C. 1971).
6 Cf. Burpo, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case for the
Prosecution, 38 TENN. L. REV. 14, 30 (1970).
7 Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 190 (1969). One California assemblyman, in promulgating a wiretap statute for his state, easily dismissed such monitoring by stating:
To be sure, the curious officer might well listen to a "juicy" conversation. The same
officer would probably read a love letter when searching for an invoice.
Biddle, Court-supervised Electronic Searches: A Proposed Statute for California, 1 PAciFIC
L.J. 97, 115 (1970).
8 117 N.J. Super. 276, 284 A.2d 385 (Essex County Ct. 1971).
9 N.J. SrAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 et seq. (1971).
4
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phone facilities "by an unknown male and other unidentified persons."
While these perpetrators were not known to the informant, they were
said to be associated with "other unknown persons or conspirators" as
part of a larger gambling group. 10 Thereafter, an order authorizing the
tapping ensued.
The electronic surveillance continued for at least fifteen days.'1
During this time, the "monitors" listened to and taped "any incoming
or outgoing call."' 12 This practice of indiscriminately taping every conversation that came over the tapped wire was the basis of Molinaro's
motion to suppress, which, because of "a single overriding issue," was
consolidated with the motions made by Richard Ptakowski, Anthony
13
De Pasque and others.
The court stated that the pivotal issue involved section 12(f) of
the Wiretap Control Act. This section states in pertinent part:
Every order entered under this section shall require that such
interception ... be conducted in such a manner as to minimize

not otheror eliminate the interception of such communications
14
wise subject to interception under this act.
Because 45 percent of the total calls monitored in Molinaro, 16 of the
594 conversations in Ptakowski, and 58 of the approximately 1,296
conversations in De Pasque were classified by the State Police, themselves, as nonpertinent, defendants sought to suppress the evidence
ultimately obtained due to the State's failure to eliminate or minimize
the intercepted communications as required by statute.' 5
Judge Handler was therefore confronted with determining "the
official rules by which the games of police wiretapping and bugging are
to be conducted."'" It seems only fitting that such a determination
should have been brought in a New Jersey forum since this State has
been a fertile field for wiretapping. In 1969, for example, nearly onethird of all wiretaps for gambling which were authorized under the
federal wiretap statute took place in New Jersey.' 7 That state authori10 117 N.J. Super. at 279-80, 284 A.2d at 387. The informer did
the presence of the afliant with said unknown individuals.
11 Id. Initially the interceptions were authorized for not more
ever, in two of the cases, upon further applications, the periods
court does not state which two cases involved extensions. Id.
12 Id. at 281, 284 A.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 279-81, 284 A.2d at 387.
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12(f) (1971) (emphasis added).
15 117 N.J. Super. at 284, 284 A.2d at 389. The state conceded
of the total communications were nonpertinent.
16 Spritzer, supra note 7, at 176.
17 Burpo, supra note 6, at 25. It should be noted that of the

place several bets in
than 15 days. Howwere extended. The

that only 31 percent

total 302 authorized
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ties should be eager to utilize their new state statute is only a natural
consequence. Resultantly, Judge Handler found that:
Upon these motions . . . the contention is sufficiently founded
that the methodic practice of the New Jersey State Police to record
every conversation uttered in the course of an interception without
regard to its investigative quality will usually result in the interception of some conversations which are not evidentiary or meaningful to the criminal investigation18
Because the "impermissible invasion of privacy was extensive" in
Molinaro, but not in Ptakowski and De Pasque, Judge Handler suppressed the evidence only in the Molinaro case. 19 Nonetheless, Molinaro
has tightened the rules for wiretapping in New Jersey.
The threat that wiretapping poses to a person's right of privacy
was elucidated by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 20 where
it held a New York eavesdropping statute unconstitutional because it
failed to demand particularity before authorization for the electronic
surveillance was granted. One of the several facts which the Court
found offensive to the fourth amendment was the indiscriminate seizure
of the "conversations of any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device... without regard to their connection with the crime
under investigation." 2' Approximately six months after the decision in
Berger, the Court decided Katz v. United States,22 in which it rejected
the traditional theory that only physical trespasses came within the
ambit of the fourth amendment. In proclaiming the individual's right
to be free from unwarranted electronic intrusion, the Court in Katz
23
observed that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
Also noted was the fact that "[o]n the single occasion when the statements of another person were inadvertently intercepted, the agents refrained from listening to them." 24 Yet the vitiating factor was that this
exemplary restraint was self-imposed; there was no requisite interposition of a neutral judicial officer whose impartial judgment would
determine the scope and duration of the surveillance. Thus, in Katz,
the Court expressed its mistrust of unregulated eavesdropping.
In response to Katz and Berger, the United States Congress passed
interceptions, 102 of these were for gambling. Of these 102, 23 were to federal authorities,
while 32 were issued to New Jersey law enforcement officials. Id.
18 117 N.J. Super. at 285, 284 A.2d at 390.
19 Id. at 293-94, 284 A.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
20 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
21 Id. at 59.
22 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23 Id. at 351.
24 Id. at 354 n.15.
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an electronic surveillance law in 1968 which codified standards for authorizing a wiretap. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 made wiretapping and eavesdropping available to
federal law enforcement authorities, and to state and local police where
25
implementing state legislation existed.
The New Jersey Legislature, when it enacted the Wiretap Control
Act in 1968, "attempted to be scrupulous about the protections which
it fashioned for individual privacy. '26 The Legislature shared the concern for the preservation of individual privacy from unwarranted electronic intrusion that was exhibited by the Supreme Court in Katz and
Berger. And so, "[i]t adopted a broad definition of what constituted a
private communication entitled to legislative and judicial care." 27 The
New Jersey Act was based upon a proposed model statute, 2s as well as
being purposefully designed to meet the minimum requirements of
title 111.29 Because the statute not only incorporates the language of
title III which demands that interception be minimized, 0 but also includes the word "eliminate," as in the model statute,81 it is "more
stringent than its forbears."3 2 Among those states which have authorized
electronic surveillance, New Jersey imposes the most rigid strictures in
that "interception of nonsubject communications [must] be either
eliminated or alternatively minimized in the conduct of a wiretap." a
§ 2516 (1970).
117 N.J. Super. at 287, 284 A.2d at 391. In State v. Kuznitz, 105 N.J. Super. 33, 37,
250 A.2d 802, 804 (Union County Ct. 1969), the court stated that the Act dealt with
"regulating the use of electronic, mechanical or other devices for eavesdropping."
27 117 N.J. Super. at 287, 284 A.2d at 391 (citation omitted).
28 Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 657 (1968).
29 State v. Sidoti, 116 N.J. Super. 70, 76-77, 280 A.2d 864, 868 (Essex County Ct.
1971); State v. Christy, 112 N.J. Super. 48, 53, 270 A.2d 306, 308 (Essex County Ct. 1970).
30 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in
such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment
of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.
31 Blakey & Hancock, supra note 28, at 674.
32 117 N.J. Super. at 286, 284 A.2d at 390.
33 Id. at 286, 284 A.2d at 390 (emphasis added). Six jurisdictions require that nonsubject
interceptions be minimized: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-30(6) (Cum. Supp. 1969); Pub.
A. No. 68 (April 29, 1971) [1971] CONN. LAws, Jan. Sess. 82, 85; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.09(5)
(Supp. 1971-72); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.06(4)(h) (Supp. 1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
570-A:9 (V) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. CODE CRaM. PRO. § 700.30(7) (1971). In three states where
electronic surveillance is permitted, statutes do not require that nonsubject conversations
be minimized. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1051 to -1059 (Supp. 1971-72); GA. CODE ANN. §
26-3004 (1971 Rev.); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1971).
In State v. Blackburn, 35 Fla. Supp. 202 (Cir. Ct., Seminole County 1971) officers indis25 18 U.S.C.
26
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The New Jersey Legislature has therefore made plain its intention
that only certain types of conversations may be intercepted and recorded by the police. The Act specifies that in an application for an
order to intercept, the statement of facts must set forth "[t]he particular
type of communication to be intercepted."34 This same phrase is also
contained in the provision of the statute which contains the requisites
to be included in an order authorizing a wiretap. 35 It should be noted
that the statute does not use "to be monitored," "to be screened," or
any other phrase connoting action subsequent to the interception. It
specifically uses the term "to be intercepted," which would commonly
be understood to mean that a law enforcement officer may not intercept
communications of the type not authorized. However, the Legislature
failed to define the most crucial words of the statute, minimize and
eliminate.8 6 Consequently, the threshold question in Molinaro is: What
do minimize and eliminate mean?
In answering this interrogatory, Judge Handler found it necessary
to expound upon the construction normally given these Words. He
wrote that "eliminate" means to "remove, expel, exclude, leave out of
consideration, or to ignore," while "minimize" means "to make as slight
'8 7
as possible or to reduce to the smallest possible amount or degree.
To the State Police it seems that these terms meant confining the
electronic surveillance to "the time of day when the incidence of incriminatory or evidentiary conversations will be highest." 8 The court,
however, found otherwise.
So understood, it would appear to be the intent of the Legislature
...that the wiretapping of telephone calls in the context of a
gambling investigation should be undertaken so that "communications not otherwise subject to interception," i.e., communications which do not directly or indirectly pertain to
gambling activities or to persons engaged in gambling or which
would not be helpful in securing the arrests of such persons, either
be excluded entirely from the interception or in the alternative,
be included only to the slightest degree or smallest extent
possible. 89
criminately intercepted 100 percent of defendants' communications for the period of the
order. The court suppressed the evidence against defendants because, among other things,
the police had exceeded the statutory limitation "to minimize."
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-9(c)(3) (1971) (emphasis added).
35 Id. § 2A:156A-12(d) (1971).
86 Id. § 2A:156A-2 (1971).
37 117 N.J. Super. at 283, 284 A.2d at 389.
88 Id. at 282, 284 A.2d at 388.
89 Id. at 283-84, 284 A.2d at 389.
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The philosophy, wording, and mandate of the statute were found
to be clear by the Molinaro court. It is enlightening to examine the
arguments set forth by the State to show that it had complied with
section 12(f). Initially, despite the fact that, as the court found, there
were "calls which clearly did not in any way pertain to criminal activities, ' 40 the monitor was "instructed explicitly that once monitoring
[had] commenced every conversation [was] to be overheard and recorded in its entirety."' 41 These included
many lengthy conversations between children in which they
exhibited typical youthful interest in shopping, clothes, fashions,
hair styles, gifts, parties, social events, family outings, games,
sports, friends, classmates, teachers, homework, school situations,
religious school and music lessons. In other instances adult females
discussed prosaic subjects such as draperies, getting their hair done,
buying clothes, their children's problems at school, food and cook42
ing, bingo, relatives, racial attitudes and church membership.
The practice of listening to and recording the above conversations
was not abated despite the fact that the detective, his superior officer,
and a Deputy Attorney General would consult "daily during the course
of a wiretap with a view toward evaluating the quality of the information obtained through the wiretap. ' 43 It is specious to contend that
these three individuals, based on their cumulative education and experience, especially in the Molinarocase, could not reach the conclusion
that the above conversations were obviously not within the penumbra
of conversations authorized to be intercepted. The statute allows interception only if the communications would provide evidence of the
commission, or of a conspiracy to commit, certain crimes, or if such conversations may provide evidence aiding in the apprehension of the
perpetrators. 44 Obviously the statute does not contemplate that the
above cited conversations were to be included as objects of the surveillance.
Id. at 284-85, 284 A.2d at 389 (emphasis added).
Id. at 281, 284 A.2d at 388.
42 Id. at 285, 284 A.2d at 389-90 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 282, 284 A.2d at 388.
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-8 (1971) provides that the attorney general, and county
prosecutor or the chairman of the State Commission of Investigation may seek an interception order
when such interception may provide evidence of the commission of the offense
of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, loan sharking,
dealing in narcotic drugs, marijuana or other dangerous drugs, arson, burglary,
embezzlement, forgery, receiving stolen property, escape, alteration of motor
vehicle identification numbers or larceny punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year, or any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses or
which may provide evidence aiding in the apprehension of the perpetrator of any
of the foregoing offenses.
40
41
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The State's counterargument was that the major reason for its
policy of recording all conversations "was a desire not to leave the
monitoring officer with the ultimate decision as to what would be recorded."

45

As one New Jersey Superior Court Judge recently stated in

State v. Borino46 with regard to this reasoning, "it is unrealistic to expect the officer monitoring the calls to make snap decisions as to the pertinency of each call." 47 Judge Handler, however, made short work of
this argument. He stated that "[i]t goes too far to argue that police
officers are incapable of shouldering a discretion which entails the recognition of the criminal investigative value of a telephone call." 48 Also,
he stated that "the exercise of discretion in executing a wiretap is inescapable, ' 49 such as under the procedure presently followed where an
overheard conversation is logged as either pertinent or nonpertinent
by the monitor.50 Even the detective supervising the investigation of
the wiretap knew "that there was no difficulty in discerning when ...
[lengthy personal non-evidentiary] calls were in progress or in recognizing these conversations as being remote to the criminal activities under
investigation." 51
Further, the court noted the wide spectrum of discretionary duties
a police officer must exercise in the routine performance of his job.
52
With regard to these, the court stated that "[e]xamples are myriad.
They include "deciding when and how to investigate a crime or when
to arrest a suspect,"3 when the use of force should be implemented in
effectuating an arrest,54 and when, in the absence of a judicial warrant,
the search and seizure of evidence of a crime is justified. 55
45 117 N.J. Super. at 289, 284 A.2d at 392. In Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. REv. 455, 466 (1969),
the author seems to assert that irrespective of instructions, officers would exercise "the
ultimate decision" anyway. He stated that "it is really asking too much of human nature
to expect that police officers who are trying to put a suspect behind bars will refrain
from listening in on his efforts to frustrate them." Id.
46 L(N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., Sept. 3. 1971).
47

Id. at 15.

117 N.J. Super. at 290, 284 A.2d at 392.
Id., 284 A.2d at 393.
50 Id. at 281-82, 284 A.2d at 388.
51 Id. at 289-90, 284 A.2d at 392.
52 Id. at 292, 284 A.2d at 393.
53 Id. See, e.g., State v. Braxton, 111 N.J. Super. 191, 268 A.2d 40 (App. Div.), rev'd, 57
N.J. 286, 271 A.2d 713 (1970); State v. Bell, 89 N.J. Super. 437, 215 A.2d 369 (App. Div.
1965); State v. Hope, 85 N.J. Super. 551, 205 A.2d 457 (App. Div. 1964).
54 State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277 (1970); State v. Washington, 57 N.J.
160, 270 A.2d 282 (1970); State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 211 A.2d 359 (1965); State v. Owens,
102 N.J. Super. 187, 245 A.2d 736 (App. Div. 1968), modified, 54 N.J. 153, 254 A.2d 97
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970).
55 State v. Cox, 114 N.J. Super. 556, 277 A.2d 551 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 58 N.J.
93, 275 A.2d 149 (1971); State v. Boone, 114 N.J. Super. 521, 277 A.2d 414 (App. Div. 1971);
48
49

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:543

Also, and certainly embarrassing for the State, was the court's recognition of the Essex County Prosecutor's policy with regard to electronic surveillance under the New Jersey statute. That office places
upon its monitors the obligation to determine whether the overheard
conversation is "incriminatory in nature or needful in terms of the
investigation," and if he reaches a negative conclusion "he is instructed
to turn off the recording part of the machine and not listen to the conversation."56

In short, the court thought that it should not be a "remarkable attribute" to be able to discern telephone conversations which are personal, not incriminatory, and not helpful in the apprehension of
criminal suspects. 57 Consequently, Judge Handler ruled that it was
"patent" that the State Police monitors had violated the statute's command in that they did not "desist from further eavesdropping."58
Judge Handler's decision in Molinaro is not without precedent.
In United States v. Scott5 9 the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia was faced with a similar factual situation. In that case the
Government, in a narcotics investigation, electronically intercepted certain telephone conversations. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs had monitored 100 percent of all calls, 24 hours a
day, for the 30-day duration of the order. Approximately 60 percent of
these calls were totally unrelated to narcotics. In fact, the court said that
"the record clearly depicts certain communications that could not
possibly involve drugs." 60 The court found that this surveillance did
not even offer "lip service compliance" 6' 1 with the order to minimize
under the federal statute. In ruling that the monitors should have cut
off certain interceptions, the court stated that "[t]he record is devoid of
any attempt, no matter how slight, to minimize the interception of un62
authorized calls."1
Molinaro and Scott represent one side in the imbroglio over the
question of whether or not all telephone conversations should be monitored in an electronic surveillance. Advocates of the unfettered use of
electronic surveillance usually support the position which Frank S.
Hogan, District Attorney for New York, has taken, namely, that elecState v. Dennis, 113 N.J. Super. 292, 273 A.2d 612 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 58 N.J. 337,
277 A.2d 394 (1971).
56 117 N.J. Super. at 290, 284 A.2d at 392.
57 Id. at 292, 284 A.2d at 394.
58 Id. at 292-93, 284 A.2d at 394.
59 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971).
60 Id. at 247.
61 Id.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
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tronic surveillance is the most valuable weapon in the fight against
organized crime. 63 Also, proponents of this position point to the value
of such a procedure, "not only as a prosecutive tool, but as a strategic
means of monitoring the activities of criminal undesirables, especially
those engaged in organized crime." 64 As a result, supporters of "strategic
intelligence" state that it is necessary to tape all conversations of those
suspected of involvement in organized crime, so as to identify noncriminal as well as criminal associates, and their legal and illegal
operations.6 5 Another argument for interception of all conversations
was advanced in State v. Borino:

There was some comment made that if one of the members
of the family of one of the members of this ring was in the course
of making a date with a girl, or someone else, that this was not the
type of conversation that would be monitored. On the other hand,
it might be possible that the date that was being made was in
furtherance of the conspiracy. And it is not for the monitor to
make a determination that it was not.66

Judge Handler, however, sided with the opposition. He followed
the Berger Court's mandate not to give an "officer a roving commission
to 'seize' any and all conversations." 67 In so doing, he protected innocent members of society from unreasonable interference with their
"reasonable expectation of privacy,"68 as protected by the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment protects an individual's right to privacy
from unreasonable searches and seizures.6 9 As stated above, a telephone
conversation is vulnerable to seizure. However, as was stated in Katz,
eavesdropping will be lawful only where it serves the "legitimate needs
of law enforcement." 70 Thus, "a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy may be surmounted where the interests of law enforcement can
63 Schwartz, supra note 45, at 477 n.102.
64 Burpo, supra note 6, at 23-24.
65 Schwartz, supra note 45, at 470.
66 State v. Borino, L(N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., Sept. 3, 1971), at 16-17 (emphasis
added).
67 388 U.S. at 59.
68 Burpo, supra note 6, at 21. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
69 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
70 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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be justified."71 Therefore, an individual's zone of privacy, 72 while not
immune from governmental intrusion, will be safe where the invasion
is unreasonable. The Molinaro court recognized the admittedly "legitimate government interest in criminal conversations, ' ' 73 but in so doing,
it also found that in order to invade the "sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life,"' 74 the conversations must be criminal and must not
involve a beauty parlor appointmentl
Even a supporter of the state's argument has had to admit that
serious fourth amendment questions arise where the police possess unbridled license in electronic surveillance. 75 In United States v. Escandar76 it was stated that
reasonableness, which is paramount in the consideration of any
Fourth Amendment search, is based on the degree to which the
interception is properly limited in scope and duration to the purpose of establishing
the content of the illegal telephonic com77
munications.
Can it be argued that the monitoring of weather forecasts, children's
conversations, shopping lists, as well as hundreds of other trivial matters
comes within the ambit of reasonableness "in scope" to establish the
content of an illegal telephone conversation, and that such intrusion is
not protected by the fourth amendment? The Supreme Court of the
State of Georgia, in Cross v. State7s answered in the negative:
[C]onsiderable portions of the tapes .

.

. recorded conversations

which were totally irrelevant to any question relating to gambling. .

.

. [U]nder the warrant the investigating officers were

permitted to conduct a general and wide ranging search through
all of the telephone conversations conducted on the telephone
71 Burpo, supra note 6, at 21 (emphasis added).
72 Privacy has been described as "the condition of human life in which acquaintance
with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited." Gross,
The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 34, 36 (1967) (emphasis omitted). It has also
been defined as the "control we have over information about ourselves." Fried, Privacy,
77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
78 Burpo, supra note 6, at 28 (emphasis added).
74 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
75 Burpo, supra note 6, at 24.
76 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
77 Id. at 301 (emphasis added). In Berger, Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion,
stated that "[t]he standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment
demands that the showing of justification match the degree of intrusion." 388 U.S. at 69.
Such a showing would seem to be no mean task in light of the fact that "[a] tapped wire
is the greatest invasion of privacy possible." Application For an Order Permitting the
Interception of Telephone Communications of Anonymous, 207 Misc. 69, 73, 136 N.Y.S.2d
612, 616 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
78 225 Ga. 760, 171 S.E.2d 507 (1969).
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lines in question during a period covering approximately 20 days
and to seize and record matters in no way related to the crime
which they were investigating. Such a search constituted a violation
of the defendants' right to privacy guaranteed to them under the
terms of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

.

. .7

It is suggested that such a conclusion could only result when the criterion for monitoring specific conversations is whether they "are criminal and would undoubtedly have a deleterious effect on other innocent
' 80
members of the society.
Molinaro, then, is an important decision. It explains the statutory
standards under which law enforcement agencies may utilize electronic
eavesdropping. A criticism, however, must be made. Judge Handler, in
suppressing the evidence in Molinaro, but not in Ptakowski and De
Pasque, because the former was in a "different posture" than the latter
two, failed to give full effect to the philosophy of Berger, Katz, title III,
and the New Jersey Act. Unlike Ptakowski and De Pasque, the Judge
found that "[t]he evil to be forestalled by section 12(f) was not fortuitously avoided."8 1 He also stated that "[b]y sheer coincidence"8 2 a recording of every conversation, regardless of content, by the State Police
in Ptakowski and De Pasque "did not in fact result in the acquisition
of any substantial number of nonsubject communications." 3 Consequently, they were not "extensive" and the evidence was not suppressed.
And so, while Judge Handler followed in spirit the language of the
Scott court, he failed to fully implement it.
If this Court were to allow the Government agents to indiscriminately intercept every conversation made and to continue monitoring such calls when it becomes clear that they are not related
to the "authorized objectives" of the wiretap and in violation of
the limiting provisions of the order such order would become
meaningless verbiage and the protections to the right of privacy
outlined in Berger and Katz would be illusory.8 4
It is submitted that since the Legislature has incorporated the exclusionary rule into the statute, 5 the decision to suppress the evidence
Id. at 767, 171 S.E.2d at 511 (emphasis added).
Burpo, supra note 6, at 28.
81 117 N.J. Super. at 293, 284 A.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Id. (emphasis added).
84 331 F. Supp. at 248 (quoted in State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J. Super. at 295, 284 A.2d at
79
80

395).
85 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-21 (1971). The court noted that while suppression of
evidence is a court-authored remedy, the legislature specifically included it in the state
statutes with regard to wiretapping. 117 N.J. Super. at 294, 284 A.2d at 394.
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should not hinge upon the number of nonpertinent calls which may or
may not, in the court's discretion, be considered "extensive." The suppression of evidence in a criminal matter should not depend upon
whether the evil to be forestalled is avoided "fortuitously" or by "sheer
coincidence." Were it otherwise, the extensiveness of each case would
depend upon the whim and caprice of the court hearing the suppression
motion. For instance, one judge might accept the prosecution's assertion that only 31 percent of the communications in Molinaro were impermissible and yet sustain the motion. Another jurist might accept the
45 percent figure of the defendants, and yet deny the motion as not
being extensive enough. Admittedly, the De Pasque and Ptakowski
cases are less capable of a definitive determination. The reasonableness
of a search under this amendment, or its permissible extent under the
statute, should not depend upon an evaluation as to the percentage of
pertinent material actually confiscated during its execution. As Justice
Holmes said in Olmstead: "I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part."' 6
Nonetheless, Judge Handler penned a significant decision by stating that:
[T]elephone conversations shall not be overheard or recorded if
and when it becomes clear in the mind of the executing officer
exercising reasonable judgment under all the circumstances that
such conversations do 8not
in any way pertain to the objects of the
7
criminal investigation.
Assuredly, he limited the possibility of a situation arising such as that
faced by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Tarantino,ss
wherein for a period of over 14 months, "the police listened to every
sound that was made in defendant's room."8 9 And thus he forestalled
another step toward a society in which, as Justice Brennan has warned,
the only way to secure one's privacy would be "to keep one's mouth
shut on all occasions." 90 To some, consideration of George Orwell's
1984 is a little farfetched. However, the thoughts of one legal writer
on this subject are germane.
[N]o judge has ever considered it within his province to issue the
constable a warrant to lurk under a householder's eaves or to
hide in his attic or broom closet to listen for incriminatory conversation. What has technology wrought?91
86 277 US. at 470.
87 117 N.J. Super. at 292-93, 284 A.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
88 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P-2d 505 (1955).
89 Id. at 593, 290 P.2d at 508.
90 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91 Spritzer, supra note 7,at 180 (emphasis added).
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In a time when scientific advances make it possible to "bug" almost anyone, anywhere, and at any time,92 legislation such as the New Jersey
93
Act, and a decision such as Molinaro, are certainly timely.

It can only be hoped that the result of this decision will be that in
reviewing applications for electronic surveillance, and in issuing orders
permitting it, courts will be admonished to instruct the monitoring
officers to desist from intercepting, overhearing, and recording any conversation when it becomes clear to the monitor that the conversation is
not subject to interception under the statute as outlined in Molinaro.
This, as Judge Handler found, is what the statute means. 94 A court
order should not constitute a mere "loose hobble" 95 upon the monitors.
Although the New Jersey Legislature "evinced a sensitivity to the
unique threat to individual privacy posed by electronic invasions,""
the Act was not intended to hamper or deter law enforcement officers
in protecting the interests of society. It was intended, however, to restrain law enforcement officers from indiscriminate electronic surveillance. While these men are the trustees of the people in a burgeoning
fight against crime, overzealousness on their part without regard to the
inherent dangers of electronic surveillance may result in a greater evil
than that which is sought to be curtailed. Legal intricacies and the
philosophical labyrinth with which courts are prepared and designed to
deal are often beyond the ken of laymen. It is, therefore, incumbent
92 Cf. Karabian, The Case Against Wiretapping, 1 PAC. L.J. 133, 137 (1970).
93 Of course, an even stronger statement by the legislature might have been desirable.
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN NEW JERSEY (April 22, 1968), it was stated:

Let no one misunderstand our recommendation to this effect. We do not
believe electronic eavesdropping should be used widely or on a miscellaneous
basis or as a lazy substitute for other types of intelligent and vigorous investigation. To the contrary, we recommend that electronic eavesdropping be permitted
only where there is no other probable way to obtain evidence of these serious
crimes; it would be confined to restrictive situations, under tight court control,
pursuant to standards which have received implicit approval from the courts
in the past year, including the United States Supreme Court.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added). Perhaps, however, the language the California Legislature
adopted is ideal:
The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and technology have
led to the development of new devices and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications and that the invasion of privacy resulting from the continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has
created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be
tolerated in a free and civilized society.
The Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of privacy of the
people of this state.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1970).
94 117 N.J. Super. at 293, 284 A.2d at 394.
95 State v. Sidoti, 116 N.J. Super. 70, 85, 280 A.2d 864, 872 (Essex County Ct. 1971).
96 Id. at 80, 280 A.2d at 869.
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upon the courts, as Judge Handler has done, to safeguard the individual
citizen's freedom from unreasonable intrusion even when it is motivated by the highest of intentions. In this regard, the words of Justice
Brandeis are particularly apropos.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
97
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Howard E. Drucks
97 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).

